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ABSTRACT

The Distant Early Warning Line:
Geographies, Infrastructures, and Environments of Warning
by
Jordan Steingard

Advisor: Karen Miller

The Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line was a Cold War era project aimed at providing
advanced warning of incoming Soviet attack via the northern periphery of Canada and the United
States. The Line was comprised of radar stations across the 69th parallel, spanning from Western
Alaska to Baffin Island, about 200 miles north of the Arctic Circle. Academic institutions and
research labs, private corporations, and military entities collaborated to develop the DEW Line.
The domes used to shield the radar from the extreme terrain were designed by architectural icon
Buckminster Fuller, who was elaborating upon a symbolic language of security and enclosure.
DEW Line designers' use of advanced technology, which they infused into the infrastructural built
environment they produced, promised to address newfound anxieties of unboundedness, fueled by
a transformed geographic imaginary, through the tactic of warning.
After years of research and planning, construction began rapidly in the Spring of 1955 and
was completed an astounding two years later. Yet by 1958, missile technology had surpassed the
scope of the DEW Line's warning capacity and the sites would endure a slow process of
decommissioning over the next forty years. The remnants of the sites have permanently altered the
landscape of the Arctic, made all the more apparent by rapidly changing climates.
This thesis traces the history of the DEW Line, which remains relatively unknown, in order
to examine the delicate intersection of geography, infrastructure, and environment as systems of an
ideology of warning. DEW Line advisors imagined the distant north through the promise of
warning as an exercise in boundary-making, and as a symbol of a networked future. The DEW
Line warns against these potential environmental futures. Though the DEW Line cannot be
separated from its history as an agent of warning, that history itself has largely been erased.
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INTRODUCTION

In 1958, Howard La Fay, a staff member at National Geographic, published a fifteenpage article in the magazine titled “DEW Line: Sentry of the Far North.” Accompanying the
opening title was a full-spread black-and-white photograph of an icy landscape, mountains and
fog unbounded. The center of the image is a plateau with a handful of scattered shelters that draw
the eye inward; a tower looms above the cluster’s edge. This is an image of Baffin Island, the
fifth largest island in the world, a Nunavut territory that straddles the Arctic Circle in the far
northern region of Canada. The island also housed the eastern edge of the Distant Early Warning
line, or DEW line, a pivotal Cold War-era infrastructure undertaking that today remains
primarily unknown.

Figure 1: Spread from National Geographic article “DEW Line: Sentry of the Far North"
1

“They’ve changed everything by building that,” the article quotes. “The Arctic will never be the
same again.” (La Fay 1958, 129).

Barely a year after the construction was completed, La Fay’s interviewee, 96-year-old
Sandy Smith, warned of the project’s complex future. The impact, as Smith so aptly put it, was
irreversible—and he wasn’t wrong to place blame. The public-facing narrative, however, sees
this warning in a different light. The project, in the simplest of terms, was a string of radar
stations across the northern frontier of the Arctic from Western Alaska to the pictured Baffin
Island, about 200 miles north of the Arctic Circle, and 1400 miles from the North Pole. The line
was meant to warn against Soviet attack via the northern periphery, a scenario that was purported
as the most likely—the United States’ weak spot was a transpolar air raid.
Given the scope of this undertaking, research played a key role in the years prior to
groundbreaking at the fifty plus sites. The article mentioned the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology’s Lincoln Laboratory, perhaps the most public of Cold War-era research facilities,
but certainly not the only one involved. The complex network of institutions collaborated to
develop the infrastructure of the DEW Line. Their relationship and the processes involved tell us
more than just the history of the DEW Line; they tell us about the pervasiveness of an ideology
of warning in the United States, the anxiety of impending threat from outside forces, and the
acute desire to create symbolic boundaries around geographic terrain. The implementation of
advanced technology, infused in the infrastructural built environment of the DEW Line,
promised to address these newfound anxieties of unboundedness through the tactic of warning.
The details of the project’s construction are staggering from a material standpoint: the
challenges of construction, importing of materials and goods, labor practices accounting for

2

Indigenous populations, and the environmental footprint of a previously untouched landscape.
Certainly, it was a feat of coordination. The main operations were handled between military
branches and private corporations, in particular Western Electric and Bell Telephone
Laboratories. The insularity of the stations, made compulsory by the extreme climate, can be
read as an experiment in community building or modernist visions of utopian housing, also
tested and prototyped heavily at this time, and surely in the decades that followed. This reading
would certainly appease critics of the inherent militarism in the northern cold war enterprise, but
it cannot go unmentioned. The visual interest in the DEW Line’s design is grounded in the
architectural style of modernism—a tower in the park typology reinvented for the Arctic. In
parallel with modernist visions of architecture, the DEW Line encapsulated the integration of
burgeoning technologies as a means of promoting order, structure, and function—all words that
can be easily transplanted into a military context.
The star of the station—its function—is the radar, connecting the outposts with an
invisible trip wire. The radar is housed in a radome, a geodesic dome structure on a pedestal that
is visually distinctive amongst the simple structures around it. The radome, and the architect who
designed it, made the DEW Line achievable in an environment with such harsh winds and
freezing temperatures. Rather unexpectedly, the architect in this case was not an unknown
government contractor, but a prominent figure in visionary design: Buckminster Fuller, or
"Bucky." Fuller, alongside his disciples and collaborators at elite institutions across the country,
as well as those he employed at his venerable think-tank style firms, designed a structure to
enclose and protect the radar in “35-foot bubbles” made of “translucent diamonds, bolted
together, [to] permit free passage of radar beams” (La Fay 1958, 140). The enclosure signals a
sense of protection, of boundary-making at the distant reaches of the North American continent.
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By 1958 however, at the time of La Fay’s article, technology had surpassed the manned
bomber of the early fifties. Instead, developments in missile technology presented a new threat
that the DEW line likely could not catch in time to prevent. La Fay writes, “DEW Line radar
cannot presently cope with intercontinental ballistic missiles. However, military realists believe
that—at least until 1960—manned bombers will remain the chief threat” (La Fay 1958, 131).
The Line was rapidly becoming less advantageous.
The story doesn’t end here, given the immense labor, material infrastructure, and
financial investment of the project. A Western Electric journal chronicling the technical
specifications of the Line, makes the following proclamation: The DEW Line “may become, in
time, a textbook classic of Arctic construction, a project that required the exercise of outstanding
skill and ingenuity in almost every main division of engineering” (Brannian, Donohue, Baltera
1957). The Editors of the Journal continue, “it is certain that, in the months and years to come,
much more will be published about this remarkable adventure in engineering.” Interestingly,
however, the information available on the DEW Line succumbs to a drastic drop, and
appreciating what happened across the 69th parallel between 1958 and 1993, when the last station
was officially closed, is like piecing together a puzzle.
What has become increasingly clear in recent years is the physical toll the project had on
its surrounding environment. Abandoned stations left to freeze over in the arctic were pillaged by
local communities, permanently altering their vernacular shelter constructions, oftentimes with
asbestos ridden materials, for example. Decommissioned transformers loaded with PCBs, a
chemical that has since been banned due to its hazardous health implications, were left to erode
into food and water systems. Waste left behind was put in makeshift landfills, which have since
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been affected by a widespread melting of the permafrost due to a rapidly changing climate. As
examples of the DEW Line’s legacy, these are critical pieces that cannot be left out of the story.
The problem we are faced with is how to understand this enormous program that spanned
across agencies, departments, and countries in light of the physical ramifications it caused. It
challenges us to consider control as a method of dominance: control of information, control of
environment, and certainly control of territory. In examining the DEW line from the vantage
point of systems of warning, in particular the geographies, infrastructures, and environments of
warning, it becomes apparent that warnings are intricately related to the construction and
maintenance of boundaries. A warning against something is an infiltration of a stasis,
symptomatic of a shift or change that constitutes a threat. The DEW line, in the various ways it
accounts for warning, is, at its core, participating in a project of boundary-making. From
cultivated secrecy to “frameworks for enclosing space,” the invisible trip wire built in the
farthest regions of the continent is an assertion of the nation protected and secure.
The following chapters cover nearly fifty years in North American diplomacy in broad
strokes, paying careful attention to key individuals, institutions, and reports, some recently
declassified, that molded the DEW operation. Surely, this does not function as an exhaustive
history, nor does it signify a rewriting. Instead, it aims to observe the DEW Line as a built
environment, one that was quietly and expensively implanted on a terrain, drawing a lateral line
in the frozen ground. Doing so asserted an American project of national security in its most
literal sense, and has a relevant place in numerous fields of research. The DEW line, both
symbolically and materially, serves as a link between disparate disciplines, and perhaps itself
warns of the consequences of letting those links go unnoticed.

5

The National Geographic article ends: “Through untold centuries the Arctic slept in
frozen solitude, inviolate in its chaste, cruel beauty. But man has now invaded their white
wilderness in force; his technology has come to stay” (La Fay 1958, 146). From any angle, the
simple truth of the DEW Line, an astonishingly unknown military operation, is that it
fundamentally altered the Arctic region. The DEW Line, even in its absence, “has come to stay.”

6

CHAPTER 1:
GEOGRAPHIES OF WARNING
The Arctic: desolate, savage, remote. A wilderness of unending barren distance. Through most of
the year locked in bitter cold and almost endless darkness; in the short summers a swamp-like
morass. Not too bad for caribou or polar bears but no place for human beings. Yet this roof of
the world holds a stark menace to our country, to our very existence. The menace lies in the
basic new fact of our time that no two nations on earth are any longer cut off from each other by
geography. We all live at the edge of the same ocean, the air ocean which envelops the globe.
(DEW Line Story, Western Electric)
So begins a promotional video, produced by Western Electric’s Defense Projects
Division for the United States Air Force. The scene is set with footage of an arctic lunar
landscape spanning boundlessly into the distance, over a track of howling winds and the crackle
of dated film footage. This video, and several others like it, produce an archive of visual material
about a specific moment in North American history, embodied in the anxiety and technological
fervor of a single infrastructure project. Those involved trace an ideological arc between
technocratic utopianism, architectural modernism, and militaristic conquest, all the while
constructing radical notions of geographical space and national borders—the frontier myth
reconsidered for the high arctic.

Figure 2: Stills from DEW Line Story, Western Electric
“DEW LINE” extends across the screen in a thick red typeface, with a faintly
recognizable icy tundra in the background. The video continues, expelling dated notions of
territorial space as synonymous with safety and suggesting that new technologies have corrupted
7

those geographies and replaced them with a potentially chaotic, overly-networked new form of
global space. In a post-World War II moment, where Americans were beginning to see their
nation as a global power—a “unified, unbounded sphere of American influence” (Van Vleck
2013, 4)—geographies of power and security began to shift with the aid of aviation and radio
technologies. The film introduces the main figure in the story, the unfamiliar region located at
the earth’s most northern circle.
The Arctic is a unique body of land for a multitude of reasons, one of which being its
national linkages: eight nations are members of the Arctic Council (Canada, Denmark, Finland,
Iceland, Norway, Sweden, the Russian Federation, and the United States), alongside
representatives from six indigenous populations, deemed permanent participants (Aleut
International Association, Arctic Athabaskan Council, Gwich’in Council International, Inuit
Circumpolar Council, Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, and Saami
Council)—all of which navigate the jurisdiction of the Arctic on a consensus basis. The Arctic
Council was formally established as an intergovernmental forum in 1996 with the signing of the
Ottawa Declaration; it is charged with promoting sustainable development and environmental
protection in the Arctic. Before the 1990s, no collaborative agreement existed between the
nations with sovereignty over territory in the Arctic on the protection of its environment. It
comes as no surprise, then, that the Arctic has historically encountered narratives of subjugation,
control, and, in some cases, modernization. In nearly every instance of external engagement in
the Arctic, the military has played a leading part. At the moment of an increasingly globalized
post-WWII world, the Northern reaches of the continent came to hold a significant place in
changing geographic imaginaries. With advancements in aviation and radar technology, the
Arctic took hold as a military object, an essential frontier in the vertical arc of the globe. In
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considering the Arctic, and more specifically the Canadian North, as a military object, the DEW
Line shows how the United States has taken the lead in cultivating and implementing
technologies of warning as a tool for reconsidering territorial boundaries.
“Just by being there,” the voice over continues, “those impassable stretches assured
against attack from the north. But no more.” Dramatic musical tones signal the forthcoming
assertion: “When men conquered the air, they changed the meanings of geography. Now from
any point on the globe, the air ocean provides an open path to any American city, town, village,
or cornfield.” This shift in the conception of aerial distance as protection, towards a newfound
fear of attack from anywhere, is grounded in the practice of warning as a tactic not only for
military engagement, but also as ingrained in American ideology. The thread of warning is a subcurrent throughout the story of the DEW Line, and in its development, the Arctic became the
theater for an ideology of warning. Inasmuch as the DEW line functioned as a technological
barrier, it also elevated Canada during a moment of geographic reconsideration.

Figure 3: Left, C.S. Hammond & Co.'s "Air Age Map of the World"; Right, Detail of North Pole.
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Canada emerged in newfound relevance because of its unique geographic placement in
the northern hemisphere. First, one must go back to what historian Jenifer Van Vleck calls “logic
of the air”—in which a new geography (fig. 3) was “unbound from the flat Mercator projection
that [had] dominated human thinking for centuries” due to advancements in aviation technology
(Van Vleck 2013, 3). An optic emerged, Van Vleck argues, in which the globe could be seen
from an aerial perspective, “which looked down on the world as a unified, unbound sphere” (Van
Vleck 2013, 4)1. The Mercator map, having mainly been used as a guide for traveling by sea,
portrayed the world as a two-dimensional space, with a distinct separation between East and
West hemispheres. With the escalation of air-based travel, an “air world” map emphasized the
poles as a way to portray the earth’s sphere. In doing so, the east west axis was joined by the
north and south hemispheric division. Suddenly, Canada was recognized as sandwiched in
between the United States and the Soviet Union, thus occupying a critical space in the uncertain
inter-war period.
In the middle to late 1940s, the United States and Canada were navigating their
neighboring relationship with the understanding that continental defense had the potential to be
mutually beneficial. The “Joint Statement on Defense Collaboration,” published on February 12,
1947, gave precedence to individual national sovereignty, while establishing a Permanent Joint
Board on Defense. It stated, “As an underlying principle, all cooperative arrangements will be
without impairment of the control of either country over all activities on its own territory”
(Jockel 1987, 2). The strategy that defined post-war American policy making was closely tangled

One of Van Vleck’s guiding assertions is that aviation catalyzed a new understanding, and desire, of
American world power: “Just as the airplane facilitated global inter-connectedness, the “logic” of the air
helped Americans to understand and literally to visualize the United States’ global ascendancy.” She
continues, “Aviation both created and legitimized a new international order in which power itself was
increasingly defined in extra-territorial terms” (Van Vleck 2013, 4-5).
1
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with questions of space and range, angling to keep “potential enemies” at a “maximum distance”
(Jockel 1987, 6). Articles began appearing in the American press suggesting the integration of
American and Canadian military defense; in some cases, it was even proposed that the American
military claim authority over Canadian defense efforts, or that American defenses could be
permanently deployed in the high arctic (Jockel 1987, 1) 2. On the other side, however,
Canadians worried about this joint venture as a slippery slope into a loss of sovereignty, with
articles in the Canadian Publication The Financial Post with headlines such as “Canada ‘Another
Belgium’ in U.S. Bases Proposal?” and “Maginot Line is Feared” (Jockel 1987, 24). The
Maginot Line is referenced quite a bit as a precursor to the radar lines implemented during the
Cold War, and in most cases, served itself as a warning against the construction of such a
defense tactic. 3 At the intersection of these two North American countries, with the various risks
at stake, the conception of continental space took on the role of distant boundary-making.
Distance as a means of defense, however, is only valuable when paired with a means of warning.
Simultaneously, architectural icon R. Buckminster Fuller was developing a mathematical
formulation for an engineered structure composed of rounded tetrahedrons strengthened by its
regular pattern. U.S. Patent number 2,682,235 was filed on December 12, 1951 and registered
three years later (fig. 4). The document is associated with the name R.B. Fuller and lists its

Readers Digest, 1946, “Partners Against Attack: Safety Demands that Canada’s Military Establishment
be Integrated with Ours”
3
The Maginot Line was a defensive line of fortifications and weapon installations built in France during
WWII as a means to protect against German invasion. The expensive endeavor is mostly cited as an
example of constructing a false sense of security termed the “Maginot Mentality” in the book Fortress
France: The Maginot Line and French Defenses in World War II by Kaufmann and Kaufmann. The
Maginot Line was also compared to the Cold War frenzy around fallout shelters, where a popular critique
was that the fallout shelter might function within the Maginot Line psychology of a false sense of
security. Kenneth Boulding, in the introduction to “Conflict and Defense” (1962), writes “The ancient
concept of defense symbolized by the wall, whether the walled city, the Great Wall of China, the Maginot
Line, or even DEW Line, has crumbled in ruins” (Boulding 1962, v).
2
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Figure 4: U.S. Patent number 2,682,235, "Framework for Enclosing Space"
function as a “framework for enclosing space.” The geodesic design stemmed from Fuller’s
interest in efficient shelter, embodied in his term “dymaxion”—a combination of “dynamic,”
“maximum,” and “tension”—which sought to produce “maximum gain of advantage from
minimal energy output” (McHale 1962, 17). His patented design takes its geometry directly from
the dymaxion project, not the Dymaxion Car or House that is most frequently associated with the
term, but with Fuller’s Dymaxion World.
Fuller’s intellectual production and architectural practice implicated modern geographic
imaginations as a usable factor. The “one continent” map, also known as the “Dymaxion Map,”
from which the geodesic typology originated, was first developed in 1938 and used geometric
structures to portray land masses in relative scale. Fuller’s “Dymaxion World” aimed to
reconsider the basic tenets of cartography, the problem of depicting a flat surface on a spherical
globe. Rather than distorting scale, direction, or configuration, Fuller proposed adjusting the
requirements to distribute them evenly both between each other and on the globe. The concept
was first publicized in LIFE magazine in March of 1943. The article asserted, “For the layman,
engrossed in belated, war-taught lessons in geography, the Dymaxion World map is a means by
12

which he can see the whole world fairly and all at once,” projected onto a globe that “can be
revolved in any direction and studied in the changing perspectives of war’s strategy” (LIFE,
March 1943, 41f). In his geographic project, Fuller participated in contemporary conversations
about territorial boundary-making, negotiating the anxieties between bounded and un-bounded
space, territorial power and networked power, geography in theory and in practice.

Figure 5: Above, Dymaxion Map; Below, Left, Dymaxion Globe, LIFE Magazine; Below, Right,
Close-up of Dymaxion Map, North Polar Square, LIFE Magazine
The Dymaxion Map reconsidered a global continental order in which the Arctic was
bordered by North America and Russia. Fuller and David Cort’s joint report explained, “(T)his
means instantly that it is U.S. and U.S.S.R, not the Axis, who hold the ‘interior’ lines. The world
13

battle fronts become two trans-Arctic lines from Australia through China to the Aleutians and
from the Atlantic through Greenland down through Russia to the Middle East” (Fuller and
Cort,1). The triangles that depicted the north pole (fig. 5) included the following analysis: "North
Pole layout of segments shows the world in new focus of air power. The U.S., Canada and
Russia control almost the whole coastline of the Arctic Ocean. One of the first to recognize the
strategic importance of the Arctic region, Mr. Fuller designed his first polar projection as an end
paper for his Nine Chains to the Moon (LIFE 1943, 53)4. The article's discussion of air power
along the northern pole stops here, but it is alluded to with the several detail images that
showcase the region and its ever-shifting boundaries. The map asks to be unfolded and
rearranged; while continental geography is not rearrangeable, and “does not easily yield precise
calculations,” (LIFE 1943) the sentiment was embodied in the Distant Early Warning Line, and
the Cold War’s implication of geography. The north, as a distant lunar landscape, called for a
geographic imaginary.
It is apparent, then, that Fuller’s project had direct ties to conceptions of
geography, warning, and a defense strategy. Trans-polar warfare, as it was beginning to be
called, constructed an anxious ideology of nuclear aerial threat from the country's northern edge.
The Arctic already played a role in the most recent wartime conflict when, in 1942, Americans
first began to imagine the potential of the Arctic in planning for defense. P. Whitney
Lackenbauer5, in his essay “Agency in High Arctic Modernism” in Many Norths, writes,

4

Analysis of some of Fuller's early writings, though valuable, fall outside the scope of this project. Future
examination on Fuller's implication of geography would certainly look at Nine Chains to the Moon as
well as some of his other geographic imaginings.
5
Lackenbauer, a professor of history at St. Jerome’s University in the University of Waterloo, Ontario, is
one of the few scholars studying the DEW Line. In particular, his books Canada and the Changing
Arctic: Sovereignty, Security, and Stewardship and Arctic Front: Defending Canada in the Far North
have been invaluable sources.
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“Frobisher Bay (Iqualit) on Baffin Island was a prime example in 1942, when the Americans
transformed it from a seasonal Inuit fishing spot to a permanent military base, an outpost in the
far North, almost overnight” (Lackenbauer 2017, 335). Lackenbauer continues, “These military
activities catapulted the Arctic into the mental map of defense planners, with the corresponding
dilemma for Canada of how to balance the demands of continental security with the imperative
to safeguard sovereignty.” The DEW line’s use of the north as a line of defense took the
militarization of Frobisher Bay to new heights. Rather than interference and transformation in a
consolidated area, the DEW line linked stations across the entire continent, both an invisible
fence and manifestly present infrastructure program. The perceived desolate landscape certainly
posed an architectural challenge, but also aided in strengthening the ideology of warning from
afar.
Fuller’s albeit hypothetical design for the “one-continent” map illustrates a general lack
of knowledge about the geography of the far north. The points that would become DEW line
stations were previously uncharted territory. A scheme of strategic mapping and surveying of the
far North was the first phase in the project6, as it carried out the physical and symbolic work of
rendering the landscape legible. From the most fundamental standpoint, the physical geography
was permanently transformed: “Bulldozers tore permafrost off the ground, disrupting ecosystems
and creating impassable quagmires. Forest fires, logging, over-hunting, and over-fishing depleted
resources in the region. Arriving workers brought diseases, from measles to VD, which
devastated indigenous populations” (Lackenbauer and Farish 2007, 925). The region was, for the

Lackenbauer and Farish further explain: “The DEW Line was made possible by a comprehensive
exercise in military geography: exhaustive terrain, climatic and coastal surveys undertaken with the aid of
the Canadian Joint Intelligence Bureau and arms of both national militaries. This was, in effect, a vast
catalog of environmental data…” (Lackenbauer and Farish 2007, 928).
6
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first time, connected to the rest of the country (and continent), and modernized in a one-size-fitsall manner. A previously disconnected expanse, now networked with visible and invisible
infrastructures: geographic surveys plotted the terrain, telephone systems, generating plants, and
requiring particular acculturation from Indigenous populations, the introduction of wage
employment (Lackenbauer and Farish 2007, 925). Modern infrastructure was introduced in the
region but was standard and not customized for the harsh environment. Alongside the physical
manipulation of the terrain, the interventions were intensely symbolic, as the Arctic, once the
harsh lunar landscape, inhabitable by humans, became a modernized frontier responsible for the
defense of the continent.
It did not take long for Fuller to realize the commercial potential of his geodesic dome
design, an easily replicable shape that has since been produced over 300,000 times worldwide
(Buckminster Fuller Institute), in projects spanning from national defense to counterculture
housing, world exhibitions to arctic radar shelters. In the early development of the geodesic
framework, Fuller wrote to Charles Edison, then Governor of New Jersey (Buckminster Fuller
Institute):
“I have several technical devices which might, I believe, be developed into important
weapons, fairly easy to produce in mass. How to get them into production swiftly and
secretly is the problem. I believe that it could best be done within the structure of the
navy department…To do a good job, I will need some real authority, materials and
machine work, and considerable latitude and patience on the part of the department”
(cited in Wong 1999, 132).
Fuller certainly received this considerable latitude, most influentially in the form of military
funding for the research and design phases of his structure. One estimate places his annual salary
following military buy-in at one million dollars (Chu 2018, 8)7. The regularized pattern of the

7

When adjusted for inflation, this salary would approximate nine million dollars per year.
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pieces enabled Fuller’s design to be mass produced, leaving space for commercial and military
appeal. The modular, mass-production prototype could be manufactured and deployed quickly
and to any distance, a key factor for successful military installations. With institutional backing,
the “framework for enclosing space” would facilitate the implementation of an early warning
infrastructure in the “desolate, savage, and remote” Arctic landscape.
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CHAPTER 2:
INFRASTRUCTURES OF WARNING

In September 1949, a US military aircraft landed at Eielson Air Force Base in Alaska,
having collected samples from east of the Soviet Union’s Kamchatka Peninsula that showed
unusually high levels of airborne radioactive debris from “Joe 1,” the Soviet Union’s first
nuclear weapon test. On the 23rd of that month, President Truman issued a statement, announcing
a new threat:
I believe the American people, to the fullest extent consistent with national security, are
entitled to be informed of all developments in the field of atomic energy. That is my
reason for making public the following information. We have evidence that within recent
weeks an atomic explosion occurred in the U.S.S.R. Ever since atomic energy was first
released by man, the eventual deployment of this new force by other nations was to be
expected. This probability has always been taken into account by us. … This recent
development emphasizes once again, if indeed such emphasis were needed, the necessity
for that truly effecting enforceable international control of atomic energy which this
Government and the large majority of the members of the United Nations support.
(Truman 1949)
This announcement spurred anxiety amongst the general public, and scientific inquiry into a
defense strategy that would directly institute the governmental interest in the formation of
research groups dedicated to the development of a nuclear defense strategy. As an infrastructure
of warning, the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line sought to address this challenge.
This chapter demonstrates that research groups and published reports functioned as a
form of warning. The reports, commissioned by military, governmental, and private institutions,
were necessitated by the assumed authority of warning as a defense paradigm. Alongside key
institutions that shape the infrastructure of nation-making, highly trained individuals in the
science and technology sector were charged with developing the warning argument. With the
threat of tangible nuclear disaster, both private and public sectors received the institutional
backing, both symbolic and material, for the rapid deployment of a warning infrastructure.
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George Valley was an associate professor in the MIT physics department and a member
of the Electronics panel of the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, a Federal Advisory
Committee that provides recommendations on matters related to science and technology, and
was in one instance described as a “slightly cantankerous visionary.”8 Valley was principally
concerned about Soviet nuclear weapons and the quality of U.S. air defense (Freeman 1995, 2).
Following a visit to a radar station operated by the Air Force Continental Command, he
witnessed what he saw as the implications of outdated technology insufficient for detecting longrange aircrafts, Valley penned a letter to the Advisory Board November 8, 1949. His concerns
traveled up the chain of command until a committee was organized on December 15th of the
same year with the sole purpose of analyzing the air defense system and proposing potential
improvements (MIT Lincoln Laboratory History). The Air Defense Systems Engineering
Committee (ADSEC), colloquially named the Valley Committee, was assembled, and their
recommendations would dictate one of the largest and most expensive infrastructure projects
ever conceived by the U.S. military.
ADSEC was founded upon envisioning a specific type of Soviet attack and it developed a
solution to the problem that this attack posed: the bomber would “fly over the North polar region
at a high altitude, and then descend as it approached its target. While the aircraft flew at high
altitudes, it would be able to detect ground radar before the radar could detect the aircraft, at low
altitudes, it could fly under the beam and be virtually undetectable” (Freeman1995, 3). This
necessitated the development of technology that would allow the military to receive and interpret

Matthew Farish, Contours of America’s Cold War, 154. Farish writes about Valley, that his “concerns
were both patriotic and personal; he realized that the location of his new home in Lexington, with its
striking view of the Boston skyline, also offered little blast protection from that direction” (Farish 2010,
154).
8
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signals from a multitude of radars, thus requiring a means to transmit data to a central location
where it could be consolidated. Perhaps more challenging was the essential requirement of a way
to detect and intercept a “hostile aircraft” via a computer that could “analyze the data in real
time” (Freeman 1995, 4). The factor of time embedded within detection and analysis is once
again a product of an American ideology around warning, functioning ultimately as a selling
point for institutional involvement in the development of such technologies.
MIT’s reluctance, as an academic institution, to participate in establishing a research
center alongside the government and military, was notable, following their participation in the
Radiation Laboratory9 and other war-time projects. It was suggested by Louis Ridenour, chief
scientist of the Air Force, that MIT’s involvement in a laboratory that addressed the problem of
air defense could function as a “stimulus for the nation’s small electronics industry,” and that
“the state that became the home of the new laboratory would emerge as a center for the
electronics industry” (MIT Lincoln Laboratory History). From February to August of 1951, a
study was conducted that determined the need for Lincoln Laboratory. This project, Project
Charles as it was named, resulted in the final report “Problems of Air Defense.” This report was
the first of many that would be produced over the course of the coming months and years, in
which various recommendations were made, contradicted, and rejected. Their report begins:
The task of PROJECT CHARLES has been to study air defense. In the four months
available to us, we have found it necessary to limit ourselves to specific subjects within
this very large field. Our primary concern has been with the air defense of the continental
United States, with only occasional attention to the protection of overseas areas and of
naval task forces. While the group represented experience in many fields of science and
engineering, the dominant background was electronics, and our Report reflects a major
interest in problems of detection and control. (Loomis 1951, v)

9

In November of 1949, U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff Vandenburg urged the Joint Chiefs of Staff on two
matters: First, to advise the Secretary of Defense on the need for technological development in the area of
air defense; Second, to establish “an air defense Manhattan Project” (Jockel 1987, 60).
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The Project Charles Report (fig. 6, left) was unable to predict, or accurately warn, the percentage
of enemy bombers of which such a new, hypothetical air defense system might be able to defend.
The report also claimed to be “unable to point to any new invention, comparable with radar, that
would provide a simple solution to the air defense problem” (Loomis 1951, v). While
acknowledging the value in erecting an arctic radar line, the research’s ultimate recommendation
suggested the redirecting of funds towards improving the current air defense systems tracking
and plotting capabilities.10 The potential radar line, it explained, posed “problems with false
alarms and unreliable equipment,” as well as the difficulties of establishing such infrastructure in
the harsh climate and isolation of the Canadian North (Jockel 1987, 61). Their conclusion was
that the region was “physically inaccessible for permanent manned radar station” (Loomis 1951,
xx). Though the report warned against attempted development of this new, harsh frontier, the
assessment was ultimately sidestepped and envisioned instead as a technological challenge.
With the Project Charles Report’s recommendations made clear, the Lincoln Laboratory
turned to computerization as the method for a new rapid air defense data handling, creating a
networked system to mediate the institutional and technical infrastructures.11 The Lincoln
Transmission System was introduced in 1953 and was later renamed Semi-Automatic Ground

The report states, “We endorse the concept of a centralized system as proposed by the Air Defense
Systems Engineering Committee, and we agree that the central coordinating apparatus of this system
should be a high-speed electronic digital computer” (viii).
11
Given the rapid schedule for testing such a warning system, existing radar models were considered for
modification rather than designing an entirely new model. As Naka and Ward explain in the Lincoln
Laboratory Journal, the AN/TPS-1D was selected because of its simple and lightweight structure that
allowed for relatively uncomplicated transportation to the sites. Bell Telephone Laboratories developed
the antenna to increase range and altitude detection for the far north; the radar and antenna combination
was named AN/FPS-19 (Naka and Ward 2000, 184). The main adjustment to the existing radar
technology was the ability to produce audible detection, accounting for human response time in its
increased detection range. Naka and Ward also note that the manufacturer, Raytheon, was located near
Lincoln Laboratory near Boston. (Naka and Ward 2000, 183). During the initial radar development phase,
testing considered an acceptable false alarm rate of one per day. (Naka and Ward 2000, 188)
10
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Environment (SAGE). It incorporated digital communication, a real-time software system,
networking, and a completely reliable computer (Freeman 1995, xii). The SAGE system
demonstrated the ability to fulfill ADSEC’s technological call: the collecting and analysis of
signals from a group of radars, the transmission of data to a central computer, and then the
aggregation of the data for human interception. This invention would provide the technological
capacity for the DEW Line infrastructure, coordinating warning with receptive transmission
strategies.

Figure 6: Left, Problems of Air Defense, MIT, 1951; Right, General Report, Associated
Universities, 1952
Similar to Project Charles, and shortly after the release of the report 12, the Department of
Defense solicited a similar study alongside the National Security Resources Board and the
Federal Civil Defense Administration; the study was to be administered by Associated

12

Simultaneously, the secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force solicited research from the California
Institute of Technology on the problems of ground and tactical air warfare, with a focus on the defense of
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Universities, Incorporated, affiliated with Princeton University. Named Project East River (fig. 6,
right) after the river alongside Manhattan where the group was located (Jockel 1987, 63), the
group’s participants shared more than relevant technical skill—all but two of the East River
group’s twelve members had participated in either Project Charles or Project Lincoln. Notably,
many of the participants had also worked together during World War II on the atomic bomb
project at Los Alamos or the Radiation Lab at MIT (Holbrow 2006, 40). The mindset of WWIIera laboratories surely carried over into the government-solicited research in the early years of
the Cold War. The East River study was commissioned to investigate civil defense with a focus
on tangible preparations such as bomb shelters and evacuation procedures and was led by Lloyd
V. Berkner, a naval reserve captain who had been a member of the wartime Research and
Development Board (Futrell 1989, 330). Instead, the group all but bypassed these desired
suggestions and looked at the active defense of the North American continent from Soviet
attack—nominally indistinguishable from the call for Project Charles.
The final report’s conclusion differed from the recommendations of the Charles Report,
stating that a couple hours of advance warning could be useful for strengthening civil defense.
The report urged: “Under these conditions, it becomes imperative that a system of air defense be

Western Europe. This study was named Project Vista, after the Vista del Arroyo Hotel in Pasadena,
California where the study was headquartered (Elliot 1986), and was headed by California Institute’s
President Dr. Lee A. DuBridge and directed by William A. Fowler. The Vista Report was completed on
February 4, 1952. It recommended that the United States “should assume responsibility for developing a
NATO tactical air force and tactical air direction centers." The Report reads: “The crux of our present
danger is in our complete dependence upon the 'Strategic Striking Force' as the principle element in our
defense. This Maginot-Line type of thinking can be out-maneuvered by an intelligent enemy by any one
of a number of ways. Opposed to the Maginot-Line concept of 'putting all our eggs in one basket,' is the
balanced and flexible force” (Vista Report, quoted in Futrell 1989, 331). While other Summer Study’s
culminated in subsequent government contracts or the development of a laboratory, Project Vista ended
with the report. It participated, however, in what Patrick McCray has called “a social reality in which
working on military problems was an accepted norm, if not indeed a sign that one was truly a wellconnected, top-notch researcher" (McCray 2004, 340).
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devised that aims at destroying substantially all of the airborne attackers prior to the time that
they reach the United States. If this is not achieved, civil defense becomes unmanageable and
largely futile” (Associated Universities 1952, 28)13. They proposed an outer warning network
that would be situated no less than 2000 miles from the continental limits of the United States,
also asserting that “the severity of arctic weather conditions has been generally overestimated”
(Associated Universities 1952, 18). As Jockel writes, this was a “curious development,” since
many of the East River scientists had been a part of the Project Charles group that had
established the Arctic as physically inhospitable to a radar system.
The inconsistencies between the two reports seems to have caused internal departmental
turmoil, as the Department of Defense quickly renounced the East River report and suggested
that the group return to the contractual job of devising civil defense measures. Instead, two
members of the East River group joined forces: Jerrold R. Zacharias, a physics professor at MIT,
approached Albert G. Hill who was recently named director of Project Lincoln. What resulted
was the Summer Study at Lincoln Laboratory, hosted in the summer of 1952 at the MIT campus
in Cambridge, Massachusetts. The Cambridge gathering is perhaps the most referenced of the
various research associations during the Early-Cold War.
The Summer Study at Lincoln Laboratory examined the vulnerability of the United States
to a potential surprise attack. The study was chaired by Zacharias, the atomic physicist who was
involved in both the Radiation Laboratory and the Manhattan Project. The group was comprised

13

The East River Report differed from the Project Charles Report in this area. The Project Charles Report
read: “It is not feasible to provide an ideal early-warning system that gives unequivocal warning of all
possible attacks. A less-than-ideal but valuable system that has a fair probability of detecting likely forms
of enemy attack is recommended” (Loomis 1951, 25-26).
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of forty-five members and consultants, including scientists, engineers, and military personnel. 14
Tasked with assessing a hypothetical Soviet attack on the United States, they claimed such an
attack would consist of five raids, for which they predicted the Soviets could cause “one
megadeath per one megaton,” with an anticipated total around 20 million civilian deaths (Jockel
1987, 64).15 Such a figure was shocking, considering that U.S. military losses during the Second
World War had been approximately 300,000 16. This Summer Study is most commonly cited as
the incubator of the DEW Line, while the series of research groups and reports that preempted
the Summer Study are left outside of the narrative. To include Project Charles and Project East
River in the popular account of the Cold War infrastructural undertaking, would be to reveal
uncertainty at the core of the project’s foundation.
Nonetheless, the Summer Study Group recommended that a “network of surveillance
radars be deployed north of the 70th parallel from Alaska across the Northern reaches of Canada
to Newfoundland” (Naka and Ward 2000, 181)17. The goal was to provide a warning of
approximately three to six hours of an impending threat (Freeman 1995, 3). Reestablishing

14

One notable member was J. Robert Oppenheimer, the leader of the Manhattan Project (Jockel 1987,
64). Oppenheimer had also served as a consultant at Caltech’s Project Vista (see footnote 6) (McCray
2004, 341).
15
Joseph Jockel, in his 1987 book No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, the United States, and the Origins of
North American Air Defense, 1945-1958 writes, “The attack would consist of five raids: the first on the
northeastern industrial heartland, where 20 bombs on target would cause 10.8 million deaths; the second
on other targets in the northeast (27 bombs, 2.65 million deaths); the third on the south (17 bombs, 2.62
million deaths); the fourth on the far west (14 bombs, 1.8 million deaths); the fifth on the east coast (22
bombs, 1.47 million deaths).” He continues, “It appears now, in light of research done since 1952 on the
effects of atomic weapons, that the Summer Study Group may have underestimated the effects of such a
nuclear strike… 20 million deaths now seems a small figure” (Jockel 1987, 65).
16
“Secrecy laws prohibited the very scientists who knew the most about such weapons and their
astonishing destructiveness from speaking about them. Whether the scientists thought a super bomb was
immoral, impractical, strategically dangerous, or just useless and unnecessary, they could not make the
case to the public, or even to Congress” (Holbrow 2006, 43)
17
This was no small recommendation, as the Summer Study Group estimated that their proposed DEW
Line would cost $370 million plus another $106 million in annual operating and maintenance costs; it
later expanded this figure to include the computerized air direction centers, with a total cost of $20-billion
(Futrell 1989, 330). Calculating for inflation, this figure translates to over $189 billion in 2018.
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pieces of the East River group’s suggestions, the Summer Study called for the strengthening of
the national air defense system, pointing to recently developed technology developed at both
Lincoln Laboratory and McGill University that would allow an aircraft flying into radar
coverage to set off an auditory alarm. This technological development impacted the Line’s
hypothetical labor force, where “in low traffic areas, such as the North, it would not be necessary
for men at radar stations to remain at their posts, constantly watching radar screens for intruders;
as a consequence, substantially fewer personnel would be required” (Jockel 1987, 66) 18. Similar
to the fallout of the East River Report, the Summer Study Report was critiqued by the Air Force
and Department of Defense—the liaising offices notably refused to bring the report to the
National Security Council (Futrell 1989, 169). This was not the end of the proposed DEW Line,
despite strong military opposition.
Jack Gorrie, then chairman of the National Security Resources Board 19, referred the
report back to the Department of Defense for reconsideration. One final review, consisting of a
panel of civilians under the supervision of Mervin J. Kelly, head of Bell Laboratories, occurred
alongside the RAND Corporation’s20 review of the Summer Study Report. RAND’s report stated
that “under certain conditions [the line] could give useful warning against a surprise attack,”
while its ultimate conclusion was that the construction of a DEW Line should not be a priority
(Jockel 1987, 68-69). It suggested, as other reports did, a focus on the development and

The development of audible alerting was aided by psychological testing, wherein “psychologists and
engineers who worked to optimize the interaction of humans to detect and track radar returns on a planposition-indicator (PPI) display. The engineers in the group often served as guinea pigs in the tests
conducted by the psychologists” (Naka and Ward 2000, 196).
19
Gorrie had also sponsored the Summer Study Group’s report in the National Security Council
20
The RAND Corporation, standing for Research and Development, is a California-based think tank that
had been founded by the United States Air Force in 1948, with whom it still maintained close ties.
18
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improvement of other air defense measures.21 In a now unsurprising move, East River’s Berkner
enlisted co-workers support in finding a way to submit a DEW Line policy statement to
President Truman, despite the opposing recommendations.22 On December 31, 1952, with barely
three weeks left in his presidential term, President Truman approved the DEW Line policy
statement, named NSC-139, which called for the Department of Defense to commence
development of an early warning system that could give the United States three to six hours of
warning of an aircraft approaching. It provided a deadline for the implementation of such a
system: December of 1955 (Jockel 1987, 70). Zacharias, an early participant in the Summer
Study’s, exclaimed, “Air defense was finally sold to Truman over the dead body of the air force”
(Quoted in Holbrow 2006, 44).
Several institutions were collaborators in the complex development of the DEW Line, as
well as institutions within the United States Military apparatus. Ultimately, the Air Force
awarded the contract for the development of the surveillance radar network to Western Electric,
a branch of telecommunications company AT&T. So began a complex and frenzied attempt to
plan for the implementation of an early warning system, made all the more convoluted by the
election of Dwight D. Eisenhower, who did not perceive the same sense of urgency around the
construction of the DEW Line.
The findings of the various reports differed, but all showed hesitation—minimal or
acute—towards the construction of a north warning system in the high arctic, functioning
themselves as warnings for the implementation of such a program. They warned against the
21

More specifically, the RAND report listed: the improvement of low-altitude detection for the existing
Permanent system, an extension of radar coverage off the coasts, and the development of the
computerized data-handling systems recommended by Project Charles (Jockel 1987, 69).
22
Berkner enlisted Paul Nitze, the director of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff and White
House confidant, who had followed the group’s work closely. Nitze then turned to Secretary of State
Dean Acheson who helped draft the DEW Line policy statement.
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technological feasibility of such a system, the valuation and cost for level of benefit, the
quantification of error, and the disruption of the balance between defense and offense. Though
all evidence led to the concept being overly ambitious, and the reports left an ambivalence
surrounding the implementation of a radar warning line in the high Arctic, a shift occurred with
President Eisenhower's administration. Factions for and against the construction of such
infrastructure emerged, and formal conversations with Canadian officials continued. By May of
1955, the Canadian Ambassador and the State Department formalized an agreement: “Statement
of Conditions to Govern the Establishment of a Distant Early Warning System on Canadian
Territory” (Jockel 1987, 83). There were several pieces left to be developed, planned, and
designed, whilst navigating gaps in knowledge about the distant terrain, and the potentially
abbreviated construction schedule.
Academic and military institutions played a crucial role in the development of an
infrastructural typology suited for the Arctic. The necessary infrastructure was both systemic and
built, visible and invisible. In particular, Buckminster Fuller’s geodesic structure for housing the
radar envisioned defense infrastructure emboldened with the elevation of warning. Fuller’s
original geodesic configurations were developed at Black Mountain College 23 and the Institute of
Design-Chicago. Prototyping was not without failures: at Black Mountain College in the
Summer of 1948, Fuller, aided by his class, attempted to construct a geodesic dome with a 48foot diameter out of venetian blind slats (fig. 7, left). The slats, meant to curve, collapsed and
thus gave rise to the use of rigid struts for the structure. Even with these stumbles, when Maj.
23

Fuller accepted a last-minute appointment at Black Mountain College, the small art school in North
Carolina, and came with ideas for innovating models, geometry, and geography. “Shortly before his
departure, he had sketched out a project on 15 June: the construction of a transparent geodesic dome that
would enable its occupant to locate his or her correct position in the universe. This was clearly the origin
of the idea that was connected to the construction of geodesic domes. Fuller called it ‘Your Private Sky’”
(Krausse and Lichtenstein 2017, 316).
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Gen. Gardner visited Fuller at Black Mountain College to see the dome prototype, he agreed to
provide financial support for the project. It was 1949, and the Summer Study group, named
“Advanced Architecture” was backed by the GI Bill (Wong 1999, 240)—another example of
research-based projects receiving financial support from the defense industry, not unlike Lincoln
Laboratory itself. 24

Figure 7: Left, Black Mountain College, 1948, Photo by Beaumont Newhall; Right, Black
Mountain College, Architectural Newspaper

MIT was central in the development of the DEW Line, housing the Lincoln Laboratory
and its Summer Study Group in 1952. Moreover, Fuller’s introduction into the project has
parallel institutional ties. Thus far, the project had encountered one major technological barrier:
the structural composure of shelters in the high arctic. “Lincoln Laboratory solved the problem
of sheltering rotating DEW Line radar antennas by developing a family of rigid-space-frame
Radomes that are essentially transparent at the radar frequencies of interest” (Naka and Ward

24

Other early institutional locales included: Cornell University, which housed the Aeronautical
Laboratory where an air-supported radome was first developed in 1948, and the University of Michigan,
whose Aeronautical Engineering Department served as the location for the dome’s structural tests (Wong
1999, 256)
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2000, 200). “Radome” is a contraction of radar-dome, and was first developed by Walter Bird at
Cornell’s Aeronautical Laboratory in 1948 (Dessauce 1999, 130). Bird’s radome was an airsupported, pneumatic structure that was at once rigid enough to protect radar equipment, and
permeable enough so that radar waves could be easily detected. 25 Fuller's radome would follow
the same premise, but would implement his geodesic design for increased strength and mobility.
By 1952, the Engineering Design and Technology Division of Lincoln Laboratory began
conversations with Fuller for the implementation of his geodesic dome concept with two
prototypes. Fuller’s development of the geodesic structure was entirely dependent upon the
potential for mass production—replicability on a large scale was built into the foundation of the
design.26 As a business, the enterprise unfolded with the establishment of two companies, in
1954, by the names “Geodesics, Inc.” and “Synergetics, Inc.” (Wong 1999, 301). In relation to
the infrastructural development of the DEW Line, the former is of particular interest. Geodesics,
Inc. was incorporated in September 1954 to “carry on the work of Mr. Fuller of designing and
prototyping, directly or indirectly for the Armed Forces of the United States, geodesic structures
embodying his patented principles” (cited in Wong 1999, 302). Implicit in this statement of
incorporation is Fuller’s collaboration with the Armed Forces, a contracted think-tank for the
generation of military ventures.
Fuller was a regular participant in strategic defense conversations in various capacities. In
October of 1941, he participated in a secret working group in Washington DC that set out to
advise the OSS on war strategies (Wong 1999, 238). Billed as a “post-Pearl-Harbor Seminar,”
the group comprised of (at least in part) Buckminster Fuller, David Cort (Fuller’s former

25

http://www.all-art.org/Architecture/25-18.htm
“In light of the burgeoning air defense budget, the radome was a sure-fire commercial proposition”
(Wong 1999, 325)
26
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associate at LIFE magazine), John G. Underhill, Babe Paxton, and Hubbie Kay. This was during
the same period of time that Fuller was working on his “One-Continent” or “Dymaxion” Map,
first published in LIFE magazine. The document they submitted in May of 1942 was titled
“Energy Focused to Win” (Wong 1999, 238). The report recognized territories and geography as
a potential frontier of defense, and that architecture could play as strategic role in its relevance.
From an early stage, military figures took note of Fuller’s construction, realizing its
practical applications in northern localities (Wong 1999, 237). In particular, Major General
Grandison Gardner, the Director of Air Installations, had been following Fuller’s work, writing
him a letter in which he states: “We have what appears to be a possible and very important
application of this (Geodesic) principle for shelter of fighter type aircraft in northern localities. I
am not sure, however, that this particular construction is adaptable to that purpose on account of
the requirements for very large doors” (Gardner to RBF, cited in Wong 1999, 237). Similarly,
Gardner suggested prototyping the dome in a cold hanger as a way to evaluate its thermal
potential (Wong 1999, 236). The dome design’s main purpose was protecting the radar from a
hostile environment in a region with temperatures as low as -30 degrees Fahrenheit and with
winds as much as 150 miles per hour. The laboratory-science approach made collaborations with
military infrastructures comprehensible. 27
Geodesics, Inc. had two branches, one located in Raleigh, North Carolina, and the other
in Cambridge, Massachusetts (near Lincoln Laboratory). The Raleigh branch mainly worked for
the U.S. Marines to develop a framework of aluminum or magnesium for the geodesic structure,
testing various synthetic coatings both external and internal to the frame (Wong 1999, 302). The

“Geodesics Inc. was a well-poised sub-contractor to larger, prime defense opportunities…Though
Geodesics Inc.-Cambridge prototyped for the armed forces, its immediate clients were the prime defense
contractors” (Wong 1999, 331).
27
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Cambridge branch was the one closely working on the development of the radome with Lincoln
Laboratory for implementation on the DEW Line. Their strategy was “focused on designing and
prototyping dome-shaped structures where framework and skin of polyester resin [was]
reinforced with fiberglass. These elements were molded together in panels which, when fastened
together and erected, would constitute a geodesic structure” (Wong 1999, 302). Early designs
had considered using air-supported, or inflatable, domes, similar to the earlier Bird typology, but
found that the necessary blowers and control equipment to maintain the airtight platforms were
too easily impaired with extreme weather, thus exposing the radar to the elements and causing a
“break” in the invisible line. The radome’s icosahedral design28 accommodated for the 150 mile
per hour winds not uncommon in the arctic. Set on a supporting platform, the dome was
accompanied by a steel tower consisting of a system of trusses and columns to stabilize the
structure. With the added complication of the difficult terrain, it was important for the assembly
was to be rather straightforward—an aspect of the design was that the radome could be
assembled in fourteen hours. 29 The cutting edge-nature of the radome project at Geodesics, Inc.
was further amplified by the materials being used in innovative ways.
By April of 1954, Fuller and his Geodesics, Inc. team delivered the first of these
Radomes, and installed it on top of Lincoln Laboratory’s “Building C” (Naka and Ward 2000,
200). A timely storm (Hurricane Carol in August 1954) tested the structure against 110-mile-per-

28

The DEW line radomes were three-quarter domes, meaning that the support structures intersected the
base of the sphere higher than a full sphere. The radomes were approximately 55-feet in diameter, stood
forty feet high, and weighed 12,000 pounds (Popko 2012, 36).
29
The DEW Line’s radomes were made up of 235 diamond-shaped major panels, 40 partial base panels,
and 86 hubs. The Western Electric specifications explain, “The predrilled, color coded panels, are bolted
together in sequential order to form the structure. Neoprene gaskets are then installed at the joints
between panels to make the structure weather tight…. To assure the success of the erection operations in
the field, detailed instructions covering the preparation of the staging area at the site and the sequence of
assembly and erection of antennae and radomes were prepared by the engineers” ( DEW Line Story, Western
Electric, 11).
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hour winds. It was subsequently relocated to Mount Washington in New Hampshire (fig. 8,
right), where it survived the Winter of 1954-55, remaining intact enough for radio frequency
testing at the Air Force field in Ipswich, Massachusetts (Naka and Ward 2000, 200).

Figure 8: Left, US Marine Corps Dome Installation, Quantico VA, 1954; Right, Radome testing
on Mount Washington, New Hampshire, 1954-55

The structure is intriguing as an artifact of scientific, aesthetic, and military histories.
Embodied experimentation and the evolution of technological means are embedded within the
shape and potential of the radome—what Fuller described as “architecture out of a laboratory”
(Wong 1999, 250). The laboratory, however, is one profoundly linked with the industry of war.
As has been discussed with Fuller’s early realizations around the militaristic potential of his
design, the laboratory is not dissociated from the socio-political climate. In fact, the laboratory
here being Lincoln Laboratory, founded by the Department of Defense, is representative of
technology and politics as couple. As William Borden so aptly put it in his 1946 book There Will
Be No Time, “There is no geographical approach to U.S. strategy which does not wind up finally
in the laboratory” (Borden 1946, 166).
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While the Marine domes were prototyped in full view of the public, the DEW Line
radomes required a high level of security clearance (Wong 1999 320). Secrecy was utilized as a
Cold War strategy as a way to limit and control information flows, and to restrict debate of
controversial research. As the Summer Studies remained secret, so did the DEW Line
prototyping with Lincoln Laboratory, Western Electric, and Fuller’s Geodesics team. This veil of
secrecy was also strategic on Fuller’s part, as his role in military research, while profitable for his
larger dome enterprise, might have been viewed critically by architectural contemporaries. The
Geodesic identity was focused on portraying a streamlined architecture, available to the masses,
whereas the radome encapsulated a deeply militarized project to which only those with a high
level of security clearance were granted access.
Fuller introduced the aesthetic component of the program. The dome itself, as can be seen
in later decades with its appropriation into counter-cultural movements, epitomizes an aesthetic
of lightness and technological regularity with its straight lines and repeating patterns, forming a
true sphere; an eye-catching form, easily manufactured en masse. The aestheticized radome is,
on its own, devoid of political implication. As a fundamentally technological enterprise, Fuller
was able to separate himself from the deeply militarized employment of his design. 30 The dome
structure is certainly the most famous of Fuller’s creations, and has over time been used widely
and for a large variety of purposes. Conceived as “environmental valves, differentiating human
ecological patterns from all other patterns,” (quoted in Chu and Trujillo 2009, 94) “operating as a
valve between inside and outside” (Chu and Trujillo 2009, 94)—inside and outside the harsh

“While Fuller claimed that he had no “proprietary interests,” he nevertheless benefitted from the
royalties accruing to both these licenses – Western Electric in procuring the Fuller geodesic radomes, and
Geometrics in adopting his patented design. Under this arrangement, Geometrics operated directly as a
commercial front for Fuller’s structural systems, enabling Fuller to act in a detached manner from the
world of business.” (Wong 1999, 333)
30
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arctic environment, inside and outside national boundaries, and inside and outside technology
and human intervention—the dome as boundary is an apt description. This more pared down
description is not to say that Fuller was naïve to its function, in fact, his early recognition of the
design’s potential use in a strategic military capacity, easily replicable and mass produced, is an
acknowledgement of war-time prospect.
Fuller’s ideology surrounding war is worth mentioning within this context. Adopted as a
technological figure of counter-cultural movements, his designs associated with hippie
communes and eco-villages, his business was dependent upon defense contracts. In a 1995
interview, one of Fuller’s collaborators, William (Bill) Wainwright, said, “We generated enough
money so that he could go on being Bucky Fuller, which was a more useful function than
designing radomes… I believe that the radome program was by far the biggest moneymaker in
the geodesic world” (quoted in Wong 1999, 334).31 Defense contracts, specifically the radome
program with Lincoln Laboratory and the Air Force, financed Fuller’s geodesic enterprise. This
is controversial for a figure publicly associated with peace movements and speculative, abstract
projects 32. His rationale was tied to notions of self-preservation and preparedness, as well as
technological innovation: “The Marines’ formidable efficiency has gained through their ability to
maintain scientific weapons at any advanced point by incorporating shelters in the form of
geodesic radomes as weapons thus making possible the aeronautical delivery of scientific
environment controls simultaneous with advanced position landings” (Quoted in Wong 1999,
336). As a behind-the-scenes figure of the Cold War, Fuller saw the geodesic radome as
“On average, the royalty per radome was approximately $2,000; and even at this conservative estimate,
Fuller’s royalty on the entire geodesic rigid radome program alone was no less than two million dollars”
(Wong 1999, 334).
32
For example, Fuller developed a project titled “Dome Over Manhattan” that literally envisioned placing
a dome over part of Manhattan to control energy use and reduce changes in climate. Even more
conceptual was his project and book titled Operating Manual for Spaceship Earth.
31
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fulfilling an “ideological and political role in affirming American technological ingenuity”
(Wong 1999, 362). Yet, he still separated himself from the undercurrents of warning, and instead
extolled the capacity for technology to bring about peace. He explained that a “totally controlled
environment will constitute a sustainable world ‘peace’” (quoted in Wong 1999, 362)33.
Geodesics captured the promise of both war and peace; the vast distance between these
worlds, both symbolically and geographically, allowed for them to exist simultaneously. Fuller is
not known for his military contracts. In fact, it is rare to find more than a passing mention in the
numerous texts written about him. Within the context of the DEW line, Fuller’s design for a rigid
radome manipulated a harsh environment and functioned as a technology of control. As an
architectural artifact, the design was a powerfully boundary-laden object that facilitated a system
of warning in the far north.

Fuller continues, “The side which has the superior fly-in-able environment controls will win the
peace…. Cool barrel of the Geodesic structures as weapons—inadvertently adopted by the Marine
Corps—is the barrel which can now hit directly, instantly, and effectively at the heart of every peace-time
economic pattern the world around without unleashing hot war—and if we win the cool war first, then
there will be no hot war” (quoted in Wong 1999, 362).
33
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CHAPTER 3:
ENVIRONMENTS OF WARNING

The DEW Line construction process was a complex maneuver, requiring strategic
planning around time, weather, populations, and landscape, aiding in the provision of warning.
The terrain for which the DEW Line was intended was, at least in part, unknown and unmapped.
Western Electric’s DEW Line Story claims that “[s]ome station sites had never been seen from
the ground by white men before the siting crews arrived” (DEW Line Story, Western Electric).
As early as 1953, Western Electric was beginning reconnaissance flights over the selected DEW
Line route to identify viable station sites—"Maps, hydrographic charts and RCAF photographs
were studied with a view to pinpointing potential sites that, from the standpoint of strategic
location and topography, were readily accessible to logistical supply routes via water, land and
air, and best lent themselves to DEW Line Operations” (DEW Line Story, Western Electric, 16).
The sites themselves required an intricate set of necessary criteria, all of which made
scarce by the harsh landscape and minimal knowledge of the region. They necessitated the
following: easy access by water for the initial construction phase and subsequent resupplying,
access via land travel to other stations, unencumbered radar ranges, a proximity to airstrips,
sturdy ground for constructing the bases (or if not, access to a supply of gravel), a clear radar
view to the north, fresh water, and access to local labor by way of native settlements (Neufeld
2002, 7). The Western portion of the line was flecked intermittently with towns, the largest being
Point Barrow, then with a population of approximately one thousand, all indigenous (DEW Line
Story, Western Electric). In comparison to the Eastern portion, however, the West was
populated; the occasional Royal Canadian Mounted Police Post and settlement of migrant
indigenous people kept the 2000 miles between the Mackenzie River and Baffin Island from
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being entirely uninhabited (DEW Line Story, Western Electric). Western Electric’s DEW Line
Story describes the line’s location as a “flat, treeless tundra along the shores of the Arctic Ocean.
It is soggy muskeg during the short warm period; then for nine months of the year it lies covered
with so much ice and snow that it’s hard to tell where the land ends and the sea begins. It makes
little difference, anyway, for the thick sea ice is practically as solid and substantial as the earth
itself” (DEW Line Story, Western Electric). The region’s foreign landscape at once made the
project a viable distant line of defense, and made the construction a scientific feat—rendering the
DEW Line at once lucrative and nearly impossible.
As a 1953 study by the Air Force's Arctic, Desert, and Tropic Information Center
(ADTIC)—a curious amalgam of extreme environments—of survival experiences in the north,
yet another study that preempted the actual deployment of construction materials, warned, the
region was “not to be entered casually or in an unprepared state. The environment presents
unique problems not met elsewhere in the world” (Lackenbauer and Farish 2007, 927). Though
materials were tested in cold climates, the remoteness of the proposed DEW Line location was a
major variable. It is likely that many of the Western Electric topographical maps were the first of
its kind in that region. By Western Electric’s account, mapping teams traveled more than one
million miles and reviewed more than eighty-thousand aerial photographs during the planning
process (DEW Line Story, Western Electric). The program exemplifies a conquering of nature,
reconceiving it into something increasingly legible; Western notions of civility with paved roads
and access to air travel translated onto an untouched landscape.
The pervasive notion and rhetoric around the land being a blank slate, uninhabited and
unsettled, is most obviously a falsehood, and signifies precisely the moment in history in which
this project was being developed. The land was inhabited by a range of indigenous populations,
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dating back centuries (Zellen 2008, xxi). In fact, the agreement made between the US and
Canada that allowed for the construction of stations on Canadian territory explicitly outlined
regulations on interactions with its indigenous people. The heading “Matters Affecting Canadian
Eskimos” is introduced with the following disclaimer:
“The Eskimos of Canada are in a primitive state of social development. It is important
that these people be not subjected unduly to disruption of their hunting economy,
exposure to diseases against which their immunity is often low, or other effects of the
presence of white men which might be injurious to them. It is therefore necessary to have
certain regulations to govern contact with and matters affecting Canadian Eskimos”
(Annex, Statement of Conditions to Govern the Establishment of a DEW System in
Canadian Territory, point 13).
The Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources was the approving body on contact
with “Eskimos,” ranging from employment to medical care, construction on or near settlements,
burial places, and hunting grounds, and disposal of waste. Should the Department of Northern
Affairs and National Resources certify it, decisions could be made by the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police. Indigenous labor was also a factor in the agreements between the United States
and Canada during this period, including numbers employed, types of compensation, and the
interruption of nomadic lifestyles. 34 Of particular interest, is the clause regarding the use of land
for the station that might have previously been occupied by locals for settlements, burial places,
or hunting grounds. The agreement stipulates: “the United States shall be responsible for the
removal of the settlement, burial ground, etc., to a location acceptable to the Department of
Northern Affairs and National Resources." Rather than requiring that the project relocate to
accommodate settlements of the likes of burial grounds, the condition is for it to be relocated.

34

In a more recent article in The Star, a man was interviewed, recollecting on what it was like when the
DEW Line apparatus manifested: “When the white people came, my body absorbed the white culture
really well.”
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By the end of 1954, the Canadian government signed off on the construction of DEW
Line stations on Canadian soil. The agreement specifies that the United States would be
responsible for all construction and operation costs, with the exception of Canadian military
personnel should they be required. The period of operation was set to ten years, subject to the
availability of funds and mutual defense needs. When construction began in the Spring of 1955,
a strict schedule had to be followed in order to take advantage of the short months of the year in
which climate would accommodate construction. Two out of four seasons were workable, and
materials would have to be imported from many different locations, through many different
means—water, land, and air. 35
The amount of material transported to the line in the far north is remarkable, and is
perhaps best illustrated in facts. “The logistics of DEW Line construction can be told only in
superlatives. The sealifts provided by the Navy, and the job of moving the machines, fuel oil and
supplies from ships to shore to DEW Line sites don’t by Army Personnel was one of the largest
projects of its kind in history” (Sheppard and White 2017, 301). Some available statistics include
the transportation of: 12,000 acres of bedsheets, 9.6 million cubic yards of gravel, 22,000 tons of
food, 75 million gallons of petroleum—this made up part of the 140,400 tons of material
transported by aircraft36, 281,600 tons by sea, and included 45,000 commercial flights over the
course of thirty-two months (DEW Line Story, Western Electric, 19). In one example, it is stated

“By ship, supplies were sailed eastward and westward, respectively, from the Pacific and Atlantic. By
rail and truck they moved northward to Waterways, Alberta, thence, by barges on Mackenzie River, they
were floated northwestward to six sites. Also by rail, supplies were transported to Churchill, Canada,
from whence they were airlifted northward to several points.” (A History of the DEW Line, 28)
36
In 1955 alone, 127,000 tons were delivered by sealift, even given the fact that waterways between Point
Barrow and Herschel Island experienced record-breaking ice conditions that year. (A History of the DEW
Line, 30)
35
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that the amount of gravel transported for the construction could have built a road spanning from
Vancouver to Halifax—from one coast to the other (Bird 1959).
Since all supplies had to be brought into the region, the logistics of transportation were
paramount to the timely construction of the line. A report from 1955 notes this: “Because of the
geographical location of the stations, all equipment, material, supplies, including POL
[petroleum, oil and lubricants] and sustenance items must be either flown in, delivered during the
very short period of the summer by sea, or hauled laterally to a site by cat train operating in the
winter season” (Lackenbauer 2013, 14).37 The logistical design of the DEW Line required
stations to be placed approximately every 50 miles, with a combination of main stations,
intermediate stations, and auxiliary stations. The auxiliary stations were the smallest of the three
and were only visited by crews every few months. The intermediate stations were continually
staffed with at least one station chief, a cook, and a mechanic. The largest station type served as
significant regional hubs, a “self-contained community, set in the middle of nowhere” (DEW
Line Story, Western Electric, 12). The seven main stations on the line varied in numbers of crew,
but featured resources such as libraries, entertainment, and recreation equipment (Sheppard and
White, 2017, 328). At first, the recreational equipment had been considered by the employees to
be inadequate, so with an influx of new personnel came extensive additions to the entertainment
repertoire.38

Lackenbauer continues, “Convoys of up to 57 vessels and 15,000 men (in the case of the western sealift
during the 1955 season) plied the Arctic waters, charting the Arctic coastline and waterways through the
southern islands of the Arctic archipelago. Annual sealift operations established new sea routes, improved
knowledge of ice conditions, and resupplied Arctic settlements” (Lackenbauer 2013,14).
38
One account from Lynden T. Harris is particularly detailed: “Each station was provisioned a major
library with hundreds of books; weekly newspapers, and monthly magazines. All kinds of games were
provided – cards, chess, checkers, ping pong, pool tables, fishing equipment and some outside supplies
such as footballs, softballs, etc. Bridge, pinochle, poker and checkers were major games played after
dinner and on Sunday afternoon. Poker was normally “penny” ante and the games never got out of hand
or created problems. Due to inadequate recreational space, the dining room was utilized, after clean up
37

41

The main stations incorporated a design that was unique to the arctic, in which all
frequently accessed facilities were housed in two long structures, connected by an enclosed
overhead bridge—forming an “H” shape. All structures were sure to be located off of the ground,
and strategically angled with respect to wind patterns, to protect particularly large snow drifts
from burying them. The auxiliary and intermediate stations were variations off of this general
design language, but certainly remained far more compact. What linked the stations in purpose
and design was the necessity of a structure to house the radar. The weathertight dome that
protected the radar antenna at both the main and auxiliary stations was built on a platform and
steel stilts up to fifty feet above the permafrost ground covering. Located nearby, large reflectors
aid in the communication network. The radome-covered radar at the main and auxiliary stations
utilized a dual-beam radar system, with both beams functioning simultaneously. At the smaller
intermediate stations, another type of radar “fills in the chinks in the electronic fence” (DEW
Line Story, Western Electric, 14) using a Doppler system that covered lower-altitude gaps. These
radar, however, were unable to provide some of the more specified data that the larger dual-beam
radar could detect, such as speed and direction. Not long after, with technological advancements
altering the DEW Line’s functionality, the intermediate stations would be the first to be disabled.
Buckminster Fuller's radome design engaged with the environment in its capacity to
construct a controlled space, separated from the harsh terrain outside the thin, modular barrier. In
fact, this functional attribute is woven into Fuller's understanding of the design as a potential tool
for defense. Fuller asserted that a "totally controlled environment will constitute a sustainable

each night to permit employees to have an area to play cards and read. Each station was provided a tape
recorder and tapes of music; a 35mm movie projector and 3 movies per week. Again, due to
overpopulation, the dining facility had to be used as a theater. In order to go a year without seeing the
same movie twice, Hollywood would have to produce 156 new movies each year – an impossibility. We
just ran the same movies over and over about every couple of months” (Wilson).
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world 'peace'" (quoted in Wong 1999, 362). This environment could be scaled up to the
enclosure of entire communities and cities and was an integral system for the evolution of
technologically advanced industrial activity (Pang 1996, 181). By commanding dominance over
environment in the form of an air-tight partition, Fuller saw the radome as a symbol of effective
American ascendancy39 over untamed parts of the globe. Technological systems representing
modernization were implanted in the environment, using a mechanism of warning to assert
power over the region.
In many ways, the DEW Line functioned as a modernizing40 agent. These infrastructural
systems, deployed in the distant reaches of the continent, engaged with a rationale of warning
against potential destruction through a means of technological advancement. Certainly one can
find the inherent imperial undertones of "advancing" communities with American notions of
modernity in this project. The physical transformation of the environment most significantly
impacted the indigenous populations of the regions (fig. 9), where some scholars have argued
that the project was a "conspiratorial, concerted effort by the federal government to lure Inuit
into settlements, where they could be controlled, overwhelmed with social services, and ensnared
in the web of welfare colonialism" (Lackenbauer 2017, 336). Lackenbauer, in his essay in the

39

Fuller saw the adoption of the dome globally as the adoption of "the American economy and the
democratic processes which provide the synergetic strength of the USA" (quoted in Pang 1996, 183).
40
Further study might examine the role of modernism in the Arctic, or “high modernism” as Lackenbauer
asserts. Modernity and modernism were deployed in the region in numerous ways. For example, the
Frobisher Development Group Committee, which was formed in 1958, was devoted to establishing a
model town in the arctic. A joint collaboration between the Department of Public Works and the
Department of Northern Affairs and Resources, the project imagined housing one thousand people in a
series of clustered towers, all radiating around a central dome (Lackenbauer 2017, 34). Design
development can be seen in The Canadian Architect issue from November of 1958. This relates back to
the DEW Line in many ways, one significant reason being the planning and design process that occurred
outside of the arctic—“Even the test-site for the DEW Line was established in a farmer’s field in Illinois,
an example of how technologies were meant to be deployed to a distant frontier rather than conceived
within the arctic as a unique place” (Lackenbauer 2017, 340).
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compilation Many Norths, argues that this view of a "grand diabolical scheme" is "fantasy," and
that these consequences were in fact unintended. Instead, he focuses on the transformation of the
north during this time as not just a physical one, but also a perceptual one, in which the public
perception of the region shifted from “terra incognita to defensible frontier” (Lackenbauer 2017,
301). This alternative to the tabula rasa of the arctic was inscribed in the land through manifested
changes in the terrain, in which one cannot be separated from the other.

Figure 9: “Native Eskimoes looking at newspaper in dump,” photo by Lyall LaLonde, 1961
Ultimately, the construction of the DEW Line across the 69 th parallel in the far north
functioned as a mechanism for making a foreign landscape legible to western defense systems.
With the development and operation of the stations, the “psychological barrier of the remote
north was broken down” (Neufeld 1998, 12). The line functioned for several years before
technological advances surpassed the infrastructure it was founded upon. By the early- to mid1960s, radar technology began to be updated, and the DEW Line sites abandoned.
On July 16, 1963, Canadian newspaper The Globe and Mail published an article with the
headline “28 Stations on DEW Line Abandoned.” The article began, “Ottawa- Canada and the
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United States have agreed to abandon 28 of the smaller stations of the Distant Early Warning
Line radar chain.” Just a couple of years after the line became fully operational, the two countries
initiated the process of rendering the stations obsolete, a process that would waffle between
periods of rapid abandonment and a slower withdrawal. The environment was embedded with an
ideology of warning with the development and perpetual decay of the DEW Line—a process that
continues to this day.
In beginning to close the smaller stations, the defense institutions signaled towards a shift
in priorities. The Globe and Mail article continues, “Department officials said the move is part of
the new cost-cutting approach to the United States’ gigantic military budget now progressing
under the direction of Defense Secretary Robert McNamara” (Westall 1963, 25). The reporter
explains, “the U.S. Government had suggested that a reappraisal of the effectiveness of the line
indicated that certain adjustments may be made in the equipment configuration and still provide
acceptable warning.” The line’s effectiveness was being scrutinized, similar to the multitude of
research groups and reports that evaluated it’s potential prior to its physical construction.
The reconsideration of the DEW Line’s effectiveness was not purely related to
McNamara’s “cost-cutting” agenda. The Cold War outlook had shifted with technological
developments in the Soviet Union. Just as the evidence of the Soviet’s nuclear capabilities
kickstarted the hurried DEW Line construction, evidence of the development of intercontinental
ballistic missiles gave pause to the north’s function as an environment of warning. The
hypothetical of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM’s) replacing manned bombers became a
real possibility with the Soviet’s launch of Sputnik in 1957. The DEW Line would no longer be
able to warn against a Soviet attack on two fronts: speed and altitude. Rocket technology
provided the basis for an operational ICBM to inflict a nuclear attack with a flight time of a mere
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thirty minutes, thus rendering the three to six hours of warning insignificant. The DEW Line
radar’s maximum altitude detection was 70,000 feet; Soviet ICBM’s were likely capable of
reaching sub-orbital heights, crossing over the line by a significant distance. As such, the process
of dismantling and re-appropriating the DEW Line stations began.
The conclusion of The Globe and Mail article looks to the then future of the line: “Walter
G. Dinsdale, former minister of northern affairs, asked if the changes had taken into
consideration ‘the diminishing bomber threat.’ No, said Mr. Hellyer, but he said that in view of
Mr. Dinsdale’s previous interests he would be glad to assure him that every effort would be
made to use the facilities as constructively as possible” (Westall 1963). The promise of
constructive use of the extraordinarily expensive infrastructure project was largely overlooked,
as the out of sight, out of mind principle of the distant north provided a veil of isolation from
apprehensive citizens.
The argument has been made that the DEW Line functioned as a modernizing force in the
far northern region. While opinions vary on the value or ethics of this shift, the fact of the shift
itself is undeniable. Materials such as sheet metal, steel, and plywood were brought into the
region for the first time (Lackenbauer 2017, 121). By 1972, remnants of the DEW line, its
construction, and maintenance were scattered around the environment. The range of materials
left behind is immense: from drums of oil to building debris, batteries to asbestos. Inuit
communities surrounding the stations, which had migrated in an ad-hoc manner, scavenged the
sites and dumps for scrap metal that was left behind, which Lackenbauer asserts caused a high
mortality rate (Lackenbauer 2017, 42). An article in The Star introduces David Kanatsiak, an
Inuit who had moved around the region as a child, who recalled learning that discarded building
material from FOX-Main DEW line station was left in a mountainous heap, ripe for the taking—
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people scavenged wood, metal, sheets, clothes, and even discarded food. 41 Shack-style housing
was assembled from these materials, which one critic states “rivaled those found in many third
world countries” (Tester 2009, 138). “From this,” Lackenbauer states, “it seems that architecture
is responsible, directly or indirectly, for many of the social and cultural ills of the Candian North
from the 1950s – 1970s” (Lackenbauer 2017, 44).42

Figure 10: Left and Right, Historic American Buildings Survey, POW-3 Distant Early Warning
Line Station, Bullen Point, Prudhoe Bay, North Slope Borough, 1933; Right, Back of master
electrical fuse panel and generator

Photographs of the abandoned stations (fig. 10, fig. 11) show vacant spaces with peeling paint
and crumbling ventilation systems, electrical fuses pulled apart and wires exposed. A more
recent wave of interest in the northern climate has sparked expeditions to the abandoned stations.
Photographs like those of Toke Brødsgaard's show station interiors turned over as if they had
been raided—drawers left open, frames dangling from the wall, file cabinets ajar. It is unclear if

Kanatsiak also recalls the dump being located on the ice; “when spring and summer came, the ice
melted and the whole dump vanished into the sea” (Contenta 2012).
42
“The shacks were public health “hellholes,” with no floors, leaky roofs and no sanitation. Epidemics of
tuberculosis and chicken pox broke out. Tester says that the Inuit mortality rate “with the onset of
‘modernization’ in the 1950s actually rises.” He notes that in some communities, four out of 10 infants
died” (Contenta 2012)
41
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the stations were left like this when decommissioned, or if it is the result of indigenous
communities looking for usable materials; the latter is the more widely accepted account. In
either case, an overwhelming disregard for the impact these empty stations might have on the
landscape is undeniable. The icy tundra of the distant north provided the ideal location for an
abandoned government program that had little to show for its fiscal and environmental cost.

Figure 11: Left and Right, Toke Brødsgaard, Abandoned DEW Line site, DYE-2

The other major effect of the introduction and speedy abandonment of the DEW Line in
the arctic was its continued impact on the environment. As such, it functions in its aftermath as
its own type of warning, a warning of what happens to rapidly constructed infrastructure in a
changing climate. Barry Scott Zellen, in his book titled Breaking the Ice: From Land Claims to
Tribal Sovereignty in the Arctic, writes that the project “did not require an environmental
assessment or review process, nor any local or regional regulatory approvals or oversight. As
strict military missions, they were accomplished using military know-how and efficiency:
completion of their construction as quickly as possible was the primary objective” (Zellen 2008,
246). Waste was accounted for in the early agreements for the project, in the “Statement of
Conditions to Govern the Establishment of a Distant Early Warning System on Canadian
Territory.” The agreement reads:
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Ownership of all removable property brought into Canada or purchased in Canada and
placed on the sites, including readily dismountable structures, shall remain in the United
States. The United States shall have the unrestricted right of removing or disposing of all
such property, PROVIDED that the removal or disposition shall not impair the operation
of any installation whose discontinuance has not been determined in accordance with the
provisions of paragraph 9 above, and PROVIDED further that removal or disposition
takes place within a reasonable time after the date on which the operation of the
installation has been discontinued.
The agreement uses the language of the United States having the “right” to remove property,
rather than the responsibility. Several paragraphs later, the issue is revisited in relation to the
indigenous population under the heading “Matters Affecting Canadian Eskimos.” It reads:
There shall be no local disposal in the north of supplies or materials of any kind except
with the concurrence of the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, or
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police acting on its behalf. Local disposal of waste shall be
carried out in a manner acceptable to the Department of Northern Affairs and National
Resources, or the Royal Canadian Mounted Police acting on its behalf.
The Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources was established in 1953 and today
is called the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND), or Indigenous
and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC). 43 With the gradual closing of the stations, the Canadian
Department of National Defense transferred the infrastructure and its accompanying liability to
the hands of the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs, a symbolic shift in the perception of
threat and the line’s viability as an environment of warning.
Between 1989 and 1993, just prior to the closure of the last stations, assessments were
convened for how to go about remediating the existing materials. The DEW Line Clean Up
Protocol, or Criteria, was a government directive that addressed toxic and volatile waste as well
as landfill leeching and other debris at the decommissioned DEW sites. The team of experts were

“As Eddie Dillon, former Mayor of Tuktoyaktuk, observed, the long presence of a DEW Line site in his
Arctic coastal village did not lead to substantial social integration of the military and the Inuvialuit. As
time when by the DEW Line became more a reminder of the continued gulf that existed between these
two very different worlds that met there, rather than a melting pot for them” (quoted in Zellen 2008, 246).
43
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privy to the same conditions the DEW line construction workers had navigated decades prior.
The last of the DEW Line sites was closed in 1993, thirty years after the initial abandonment of
the smallest intermediate stations. Five years after the last station closed, attention officially
turned toward the question of remediation. Over the years, materials and waste were discarded in
makeshift dumps, some left in situ, and others foraged by local communities for shelter. K.L.
Capozza’s article in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists titled “The DEW Line: Ditched Drums and
All” references “mountains of rusted oil drums, leaking transformers, discarded heavy
machinery, solvents, and batteries” (Capozza 2002, 14). An understanding of the materials
brought into the arctic during the rapid months of construction provides insight into just what
types of harmful materials were left behind (fig. 12).

Figure 12: DEW Line cleanup at Cape Dyer, eastern edge of Baffin Island, Toronto Star

One particularly pressing concern was the remediation of polychlorinated biphenyls
(PCB’s)44, of which thirty tons were brought into the region in the mid- to late-fifties for both

Recent scientific knowledge has shown that PCB’s can cause cancer, bacterial infection, liver lesions,
and genetic defects in animals, which the local communities hunt and eat (Capozza 2002, 15). Point
Hope, a small hunting community near the Cape Lisbourne DEW line site, is one such instance of
44
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construction and maintenance (Capozza 2002, 14). PCB’s, which have since been banned, were
mainly used in transformers made to withstand the extreme temperatures and high electrical
currents; their composition prevents them from breaking down in the environment. These, and
other toxic substances, have begun leeching into the environment. 45 Robert Eno, a Canadian
hazardous waste specialist, has observed of the abandoned sites, “looking at what we found
there, you’d think that the Americans took big hoses and sprayed PCB liquid all over the site”
(quoted in Capozza 2002, 15). Eno was a member of the team that first assessed the sites in the
early nineties, discovering the previously unknown situation with PCBs. A “halo of
contamination” was found surrounding the former DEW stations (Contenta 2012).46
The remediation protocol was aimed at making the region environmentally safe—as
Lackenbauer and Farish so aptly put it, “environmental and human security became inseparable”
(Lackenbauer and Farish 2007, 940). The toxic waste such as the materials contaminated with
PCBs would need to be transported to allocated sites for incineration. Less hazardous waste is
buried on site, using an established landfill technique of gravel walls and coverings. However,
there is concern that with the changing climate, the landfills will quickly weaken. In one
instance, at a site in the Northwest Territories, a rainstorm caused the side of a landfill to erode,
which then had to be rebuilt (Contenta 2012). Even more concerning is the gradual melting of

pollution from the station impacting local food systems. The mayor of Point Hope, Caroline Canon, wrote
in 2002 that “we know that there’s a possibility of our food being affected, but we believe that the food
we eat is part of who we are” (quoted in Capozza 2002, 16).
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“The frigid Arctic climate and lack of sunlight impede the natural breakdown of pollution. Five decades
later, PCB, heavy metal, and fuel contamination persist in the delicate Arctic ecosystem. ‘In the Arctic,
fat is the economy of life. Animals eat each other’s fat in order to stay warm because it’s the most
efficient way of transferring heat and energy,” says Hild. ‘When they [PCBs] get into the environment,
they don’t break down, and they bio-accumulate because they stick to fat and move through the food
chain’” (Capozza 2002, 15).
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One study used the Potential Environmental Risk Classification system to evaluate the landfills, which
received a score of 150. On their scale, above 100 classifies the risk at “high” (Nahir, Ankersmit, Ingham
2004).
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the region’s permafrost, instituting the need for higher landfill coverings. The remediation team
has advised that the goal is to “prevent the summer thaw from causing the landfill to leach”
(Contenta 2012).
The remediation proposal was extensive and costly. One source valued the cost of
Canadian clean-up at $470 million, another at $583 million. While precise records for the overall
cost of the construction of the DEW line are either unavailable or remain classified, popular
opinion estimates that, when adjusted for inflation, it approaches $750 million. This does not
account for materials and maintenance after the initial construction phase. By 1998, after enough
diplomatic pressure from Canadian government, the United States agreed to contribute $100
million to the clean-up effort. However, the funds were only transferrable in the form of credit
towards the purchase of American military equipment. The “arms-for-cleanup deal,” as Capozza
has deemed it, is an unsurprising conclusion to the United States’ military undertaking on
Canadian soil.
The environment itself, as a legacy of geographies and infrastructures of warning, is left
with the DEW Line hardware seeping into its systems. Contemporary understandings of the
distant north have participated in the promise of warning as an exercise in boundary-making, and
as a symbol of a networked future. The DEW Line warns against these potential environmental
futures. Though the DEW Line cannot be separated from its history as an agent of warning, that
history itself is largely erased.
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CONCLUSION

By 2014, the Canadian Department of National Defense announced that the DEW Line
clean-up project was complete. Federal Treasury Board President Tony Clement stated that the
“remediation work of each site typically consisted of demolition of infrastructure, cleaning up or
removing of contaminated soils, stabilizing of landfill sites and the construction of new and
innovatively engineered landfills designed to stand the test of time” (CBC News 2014). The
DEW Line, as has become increasingly clear, was not built to stand the test of time in any
sustainably-minded sense of the phrase. Rather, its resilience against the natural decay of time
was second to strengthening the Line’s fortitude against its surrounding environment.
Contemporary knowledge of materials such as PCBs showcase an alternative view of
longevity—one that, in its very persistence, manages to permanently damage the land it was
trying to protect. The history of the DEW Line, told accurately, embodies multiple such
contradictions. Its legacy, though shrouded in layers of government secrecy, includes the
transformation of Arctic geographies and imaginaries, as well as an object lesson in how
militaristic technologies are taken up as part of everyday life and transformed to have wildly
different cultural meanings.
The geographic transformation of global space that occurred with technological
advancements in air travel remade the Arctic as a frontier of the North American continent. With
the understanding of routes by air rather than by sea or land, the region was suddenly situated at
the heart of Cold War tensions, an unbounded border that needed to be secured. Thus, geography
plays a role in the DEW Line's story through its dynamic with assertions of territory and control.
Alongside newly developed technologies in both radio and aeronautics, topographic space
became increasingly boundless. Communication and travel opened up the possibility of
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globalization like never before. Geographic imaginings of the north were permanently altered
with the use of technology to create boundaries.
The DEW Line is evidence of an ideology of warning completely inseparable from power
and control. As a piece of infrastructure it can be understood as both symbolic—documented and
theorized through the numerous research groups and published reports—as well as material—
physically manifested through architectural forms. As such, the DEW Line produces a built
environment with its own history. Yet, as a tactical measure that impacted past and future
understandings of northern boundaries, the DEW Line is surprisingly absent from contemporary
discourse in many of its related fields. There are numerous explanations for this, some of which
are kept secure by military and inter-governmental agreements. From the records that are
publically available, it does not seem that the DEW Line ever had the opportunity to fulfill its
call to warn of incoming attack from the north. While warning takes many shapes, and its sheer
presence in the arctic surely had an effect, the trip wire along the 69th parallel was established
with technologies that rapidly became obsolete. The legacy of this immense project, then, is not
just underpinning an ideology of warning, but also one of erasure.
One particularly vivid narrative of erasure is the symbolic legacy of the geodesic dome
design. As early as 1952, the geodesic rigid radome was exhibited at New York's Museum of
Modern Art in an exhibit titled “Two Houses, New Ways to Build.” Outside of the context of the
DEW Line, and its functional, militaristic purpose, the structure was displayed as an art object, a
product of design potential and innovative shelters. The original function of the geodesic rigid
radome was mentioned briefly in the wall text, in which curator Arthur Drexler wrote that “this
particular dome is used to house radar installations on the Arctic Distant Early Warning Line”
(Chu and Trujillo 2009, 129). Instead, the curator emphasized the radome's potential future as an
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infrastructure of industry, enclosing TV studios, ball parks, swimming pools, and houses (Chu
and Trujillo 2009, 129-30). As the DEW Line was just taking shape, its legacy as a militarized
warning system was already being erased.

Figure 13: The Community Building at Drop City, ca. 1967

As many architectural and cultural scholars have noted, the geodesic dome perhaps most
glaringly signifies the counter-cultural prospects of the 1960s and 70s—an "empty vessel in
which a new, egalitarian society could be contained" (Pang 1996, 167). The Drop City domes in
Trinidad, Colorado, (fig. 13) an icon of communes appropriating the dome design, was
constructed using building manuals such as Domebook out of pieced together materials including
car hoods, plywood, and wire. The cooperative nature of these communities was intricately tied
to the politics of boundary-making: the egalitarian society would be "contained" within the
jumbled dome. Fuller, the paragon of alternative architecture and the promise of design science,
was held up by what today we would recognize as the military-industrial complex. How does this
complicate our understanding of iconic figures like Fuller? We come to understand Fuller as at
once a participant in the ideology of warning that was so pervasive at the time, yet
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simultaneously celebrated for his pacifist visions of world peace. What is clear is that visionary
ideas about the built environment are never simple, and always reverberate outwards. Visionary
ideas about warning function similarly.
What does the legacy of the DEW Line, told accurately, including the ways it impacted
geographies, infrastructures, and environments across the continent, tell us about American
notions of power? How might we view the Arctic in light of this history? What does the erasure
of all traces of military origins in the popular imaginary of the geodesic dome reveal about the
power of ideologies of warning and security to permeate everyday life? Such questions are
especially urgent as contemporary forms of securitization, largely focused on surveillance,
emerge directly out of the warning ideologies embodied by the DEW Line. Indeed, though such
projects use ever more advanced technologies, they still operate and exploit the same delicate
intersection of geography, infrastructure, and environment as the DEW Line. Surveillance and
warning are close allies; as we enter an age in which mechanisms for surveillance penetrate all
facets of modern life, lessons can and should be learned from legacies of the Distant Early
Warning Line.
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